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\THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

----------------------------------;/!£STATE OF UTAH,
Piaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.

-vs -

12140

1JNTON E. ROBERTS,

Ddendant-A ppellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction of Grand
,:·ceny in the Seventh Judicial District Court in and
.r

e

Carbon County, the Honorable Henry Rugerri, Judge,
,,iding.
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BEWW
Appellant was charged with Grand Larceny in

,Jation of Section 76-38-4, Utah Code Ann. (1953) by
c<:forrnation filed on December 16, 1969.
· · Wcts

'dtct

A trial by

had on March 23, 1970, and the jury returned
of guilty.

Judge Henry Rugerri entered

.agnwnt upon the verdict on April 6, 1970, and
ntenced the appellant to a term in the Utah State
,.-;,HJ

\

uf not less than one year nor more than ten

l '"

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks a reversal of the conviction
::ieventh Judicial District Court.

ti1c

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On November 12, 1969, Mr. John Peperakis, the
· :· r ltltendent

was

of the Kaiser Steel Mine at Sunnyside,

making his evening rounds of the workings

mine when he observed an unfamiliar truck parked

:1e:

c<Y' CJ.

materials storage area. Upon further investigation,

· observed an individual feeding copper cable from the
· 11

;:ige e:n·ea into the back of the van (Tr. 71).

Peperakis

drove down to his shop and picked up his night forel\ldncbester, and they returned together to confront
·· ".lUSpected thieves.

Peperakis stayed in the car

tle Manc:hester approached the truck on foot.
.:r one

At this

of the individuals approached Peperakis and

:,1nt-<.J that they were merely "doing a little drinking"

-2-

.. . bO)

..

'

and then climbed into the truck behind the

•·.,r's wheel.
, ,11en

By this time Manchester had realized

were going to attempt an escape and he tried to

, ); the door handle on the driver's side, but the truck
,,,ii ::nvay

despite Manchester's efforts (Tr. 80).

ft is important to note that the testimony of both

. , !'( ro.kis and Man chester indicates that at no time

ing 1 he above incident were more than two men

• i

"'"rved at the scene of the crime.
c:1,

On cross- examina -

Peperakis was asked specifically how many individuals

ol.Jserved.

He testified as follows:

Q.
A.

Did you see any other individuals?
Not at that time, sir. No sir.

Q.

Your testimony is that you saw the
two individuals that you have
testified concerning?
(Tr. 73)
Yes sir.

A.

Manchester made the following statement under
'" -;-l'Xa

min at ion:
Q.

A.

.

Q.

A

And the only individual you saw that
night was the man behind the wheel?
No. I seen a man behind the truck
also.
But you surely couldn't identify the
man at the rear of the truck?
No. All I seen was the back of the man.

Q.
A.

And that is the only two individuals that
you saw?
That is right.
(Tr. 81•82)

After the truck left the scene of the crime, it
•&S

followed for a short distance by Peperakis (Tr. 61and

then later was followed by a motorist who was

'ic"·rned about the cable hanging out the rear of the

1an (Tr. 103-107), and finally by the arresting officer,
'.1lton (Tr. 83-84).
·.:rtt-'

A review of the testimony of the

persons who pursued the van indicates that there

,.,·re periods when the van stopped momentarily, and
'

1

Pre were times when the van was out of the sight of

giving chase.

In any event, where only two men

'Jc observed at the scene of the crime, when the
t•uck was finally pulled over by Officer Tilton, there
1

·'.r0

11

three men in the cab of the truck.

\nton

The appellant,

E. Roberts, was among them.

Roberts elected to take the stand in his defense,
r;.

;pite exposure to impeachment because of the prior

r···.irtion of a felony, and explained to the jury the
series of events that led to his arrest.

u·
t

·.

His

was that he had driven into Carbon County with
-4-

111 .1

two friends but they had dropped him off in Dragerton

pnor to the incident at the mine.
tt

t

Roberts testified that

reason he was dropped off was to enable him to
a friend in order to inform him of a job opportunity.

Tiley agreed to pick him up at around 8: 00 p. m. at the

they dropped him off.
tl:at he

Roberts then testified

was unable to locate his friend but did find his
brother, Kenny Kinsey, and the two of them

Wrnt to drink some beer.

At about 8:00 p. m. Roberts

:ro'.tficd that he went back on the highway, and after
Wliting about 15 or 20 minutes, he was picked up by his
ir1rnds as arranged.

Roberts started driving from that

;ic,i.nt, and next he observed the motorist, Aragon, flashing
i.1° lights, and that is when his friends explained about

inci<ient at the mine.

At that point, Officer Tilton

r"d Joined the chase and Roberts pulled over when the
/ Lf·r

turned on his red light (Tr. 114-117).

When the defense attempted to introduce the
)ttrnony of the alibi witness, Kenny Kinsey, the
objected and the matter was argued outside

;·
'-1

e.sence of the jury.

The basis of the prosecutor's

-5-

was that the Notice of Alibi, filed by the
idcnsc (R-15), was insufficient.
· l

The court cited

statute, Section 77-22-17, Utah Code Ann. (1953),
cilso relied on an ALR annotation dealing with the

cuffiricncy of a Notice of Alibi, 30 ALR 2d 476, and,
,j "

result, the appellant was not allowed to produce

·1is alibi witness (Tr. 124-129).

Being deprived of its alibi witness, the defense
:·ested.

After less than 30 minutes of deliberation the

JJry brought in its verdict of guilty (Tr. 143).

ARGUMENT
THE EXCLUSION OF THE APPELLANT'S ALIBI
WITNESS ON THE GROUND THAT THE NOTICE
OF ALIBI WAS INSUFFICIENT WAS AN ABUSE
OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION AND
CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR.
Section 77-22-17, Utah Code Ann. (1953) provides
,

Whenever a defendant shall propose to
offer in his defense evidence to establish
an alibi on behalf of the defendant, such
defendant shall at the time of the arraignment or within ten days thereafter, but
not less than four days before the trial of
such cause, file and serve upon the prosecuting attorney in such cause, notice in
writing of his intention to claim such
-6-

defense, and in case of a claimed
alibi, such notice shall nclude
specific information as to the place
at which the accused claims to have
been at the time of the alleged offense.
If the defendant fails to file such notice ,

he shall not be entitled to introduce
evidence tending to establish an alibi.
The court may, however, permit such
evidence to be introduced where good
cause for the failure to file the notice
has been made to appear.

The attorney for the appellant attempted to comply
'itfi the above statute by filing the following Notice of

Defense of Alibi:
Comes now the defendant above named
and hereby gives notice of his intention
to present the defense of alibi at the
Trial of the above-entitled cause. (R-13)
The attorney certified that he mailed a copy of
·ie

i'Jotice to the attorney for the plaintiff on March 18,

iflU; C1nd the Notice was filed with the clerk of the
ourt on March 20, 1970.

Although the filing did not

:ake place more than four days prior to the trial, as

,e4uired by the statute, that is not relevant for
'.

'1rposes

1

of 1his appeal because the objection to the

ni,·e of Alibi was not on the ground of an untimely
.itrig

but rather the insufficiency of the notice.

Appellant admits that the Notice of Alibi did not
,,'.Tlply with all the requirements of the statute,
specifically, there was no "information as to the place

a: which the accused claims to have been at the time
0:·

the

alleged offense. "

The attorney for the appellant

attempted to explain the insufficiency in the Notice as
follows:

Mr. Moody: Your Honor, this last
sentence states the court may,
however, permit such evidence to
be introduced where good cause
for the failure to file the notice
has been made to appear. Now I
filed the Notice, your Honor, and
I couldn't go into it any more than
I did because I hadn't talked with
the defendant Kenneth Kinsey and
didn't want to put forth in the
form of some kind of a representation as to what his testimony was
until I had an opportunity to talk
to him. And that is the reason I
didn't go any further with my Notice
than I did.
(Tr. 128)
It is appellant's contention that the purpose of the
of Alibi statute had been complied with, and
te trial court abused its discretion in excluding the
lllbi Witness.
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has on

interpreted the statute requiring Notice

,Jt ,""\.'l.b1·
1 •

In State vs. Wa1·d

92Utah297, 67P.2d647

the court stated:
Its purpose (the Utah Statute on Notice of
Alibi) clearly is to erect safeguards
against the wrongful use of the defense's
alibi and give the prosecution time and
information to investigate the merits of
such defense. With such safeguards
the natural effect would be to give
greater weight, not less, to an alibi
which such investigation has failed to
refute.
67 P. 2d at 651
Again in State vs. Whitely, 100 Utah 14, 110 P. 2d
!37 (1941), the court emphasized that the purpose of
rne

statute requiring a Notice of Alibi was to "erect

safeguards against the wrongful use of the defense of
,lJbi,

II

110 P • 2d at 33 9,

Perhaps the best statement of the policy underlying the Notice of Alibi statutes is found in State vs.

!hayer, 124 Ohio St. 1, 17 6 N. E. 656, where the court
·"3S

b

passing upon the constitutionality of the statute.
. . . this law pertains to a very
important feature of the criminal
law. It gives the states some protect ion against false and fraudulent
claims of alibi often presented by
the accused so near the close of the
trial as to make it quite impossible
for the state to ascertain any facts
as to the credibility of the witnesses
called by the accused, who may reside
at some point far distant from the place
of trial.
176 N. E. at 657

In ascertaining the purpose underlying the alibi
stJtL1tes, it is significant to note that, as stated in
vs. Schade, 161 Misc. 212, 292 N. Y. S. 612:
The purpose of the adoption of the alibi
statutes in Ohio, Michigan, and this
state is obvious. It was designed to
prevent the sudden popping-up of witnesses to prove that the accused was
not at the scene of the crime at the
time of its commission and thus creating
a "reasonable doubt 11 about the testimony
of the state's witnesses. The bringing
into the courtroom of "phony alibi"
witnesses at the eleventh hour and at
a time which, in practice, affords the
prosecutor no opportunity to check
either the credibility of the witnesses
or the accuracy of their statements is
avoided by the alibi statutes. An alibi
defense refuted is worse than no defense
at all. Therefore, (the alibi statute)
promotes to the ends of justice, and in
this respect at least, makes of our
Criminal Code "A sword for the guilty
and a shield for the innocent. 11 That that is
the real purpose of a Criminal Code and
of a Penal Law has apparently been lost
sight of in recent years.
292 N. Y. S.
at 617
Appellant has set forth the above authorities in
.ricr

to establish that the purpose of the Utah Alibi

3hite

is specifically to protect this state from unfair

·prise at trial.

.

The record will show that there

no danger in this case of the prosecutor being
-10-

,;urprised at trial by the introduction of "eleventh
'1 0

ur" alibi testimony, rather, the state was well

prepared to refute the alibi testimony of which it had
Leen notified prior to the trial.

The exclusion of the

ipµellant's alibi witness was an abuse of the trial
l·ourt's discretion and violated the appellant's constiturional right "to have compulsory process to compel
;11e

attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, " as

:;uaranteed by Article 1, Section 12 of the Constitution
of Utah.

Appellant is not attacking the constitutionality

of the Utah Alibi Statute but is attacking the constitu-

rionality of invoking the statute in his case where the
ourpose of the statute had been satisif ed.

A review of the record shows that a subpoena
.1as

01

issued by the prosecution compelling the attendance

Stella Kinsey at the trial of Clinton E. Roberts (R-25).
hE. obvious intent of the prosecution was to refute the

1

;Jibi testimony of Kenny Kinsey through the testimony
·i

Lis wife, Stella Kinsey.

When Mr. Kinsey was not

ltowed to testify, the testimony of Stella Kinsey was

(. l()nger necessary.

In effect, the prosecution had
-11-

·' two-barreled attack- -on the one hand the prosecution
, turned unfair surprise due to an insufficient Notice

"r .\lib1, and if that should fail the prosecution was
prepared to refute the "surprise" testimony of Kenny
l\insey, through the testimony of his wife.

The

iriconsistency and injustice of this tactic by the prosecittion

lS

evident.

While it is clear that the prosecution was well
,. 1va.re of the nature of the appellant's alibi, further
t.1

idence of this can be found in the transcript.

·lie

While

aµµellant was being cross-examined by the prose-

1;1111g

attorney the following exchange occurred:
Q.

. . . and you and Kenny Kinsey had
been sharing the Carbon County
Jail for the past- -

Mr. Moody: Objection, your Honor.
This is an irrelevant and improper
question.
Mr. Bunnell: For the last couple of
months, have you not?
The Court: Read the question Mr. Reporter.
read)
The Court:

What do you say?

Mr. Bunnell: I think it is relevant to
show the association of this man he
says he was visiting. I think I am

entitled to go into their association.
Whether they are friends, relatives,
have been living together, or any of
their aspects. That is what I am
trying to show.
The Court: The objection is overruled.
The witness may answer.
The Witness: What is the question again?
Q.

(By Mr. Bunnell) Isn't it true, Mr.
Roberts, that you and Mr. Kinsey
have been sharing the Carbon County
Jail for the last couple of months or
at least the last month?

A.

Yes sir.

Q.

And it was while you were there with
Mr. Kinsey that you and he cooked up
this story about you being with him
and not being present at the time the
theft took place?

A.

No sir.

(Tr. 122-123)

This is another example of the prosecution's dual
Mack.

Before the appellant is allowed to put on his alibi

.vitness, the District Attorney is permitted to inform the
:ury

that the alibi witness is a resident of the County

Jail, and further impeaches the credibility of Mr.
:\ii1sey
!th

by accusing him of "cooking up this story"

the appellant.

Then, after making his attack on

'Tedibility and character of Mr. Kinsey, the State
-13-

. ects to the admission of the testimony on the ground

·OD!

•

I II

of ''unfair surprise.

Appellant submits that the prosecution was aware
o! and well-prepared to refute the testimony of the
appellant's alibi witness, and, thus, did not require
!he protection of the Alibi Statute.

In view of the

attack on Mr. Kinsey, it was evident
to the court that the District Attorney was prepared to
refute the appellant's alibi, therefore, to exclude the
testimony of Mr. Kinsey was a violation of the court's
discretion and constitutes reversible error.
CONCLUSION
The Utah Supreme Court has expressly stated
1nat

the purpose underlying Section 77-22-17, Utah

'(0de Ann. (1953) is to "erect safeguards against the

ll'rongful use of the defense of alibi and give the
prosecution time and information to investigate the
rnerits of such defense. " State vs. Waid, supra.
A; clarified by the other authorities above-quoted,

essential purpose of the statute is to protect the
t.csecution from unfair surprise at trial.
-14-

Where the

subpoenaed the wife of the proposed alibi
wit:iess

for the purpose of refuting his testimony, and

w:iere the prosecuting attorney knew enough about the
proposed alibi witness to attack his character and
:;edibility, it cannot be said that the prosecution was
in violation of the Alibi Statute.
The Utah Constitution in Article 1, Section 12,
the defendant in a criminal action the right
to present witnesses on his behalf.

To exclude the

appellant's alibi witness on the basis of an insufficient
!\otice of Alibi, where the prosecution actually had
ii1ITicient notice, is a rigid adherence to the letter of the
I

liaw constituting an abuse of the trial court's discretion
lind a denial of the appellant's constitutional rights.

Based upon the foregoing reasons, the appellant

!submits that the trial court's conviction must be

Respectfully submitted,
WENDELL E. BENNETT of
STRONG & HANNI
604 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for DefendantAppellant

